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The Virginia court in Morris v. Bragg'3 held that the broker could col-
lect a commission where the owner promised to pay the commission if the
property was sold by the broker or any other, where the owner sold the
property himself. On the other hand, the Illinois court in Wozniak v.
Siegle,14 in an exclusive agency contract, held that substantially similar
language was inadequate to give the broker a right to a commission.
In summary, it can be said that, while some courts automatically allow
the broker a commission under an exclusive right to sell contract where
the owner effects the sale himself, many courts require strong, positive
language indicating such an intention. The language of the provision in
the Brown case was sufficient to manifest this intention.
1' 155 Va. 912, 156 S.E. 381 (1931).
14 226 Ill. App. 619 (1922).
CRIMINAL LAW-MULTIPLE TRIALS FOR A SINGLE
TRANSACTION INVOLVING SEVERAL OFFENSES
HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
In several recent United States Supreme Court decisions, the issue was
raised as to whether an accused's right to due process as guaranteed under
the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where he is subjected to multiple
trials for a single transaction involving several different offenses. In Hoag
v. State of New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), three armed men entered a
tavern, lined up five persons against a wall and robbed each of them. Hoag
was arrested and indicted for the robbery of three of the victims. At the
trial only one of the victims was able to identify Hoag as one of the rob-
bers. Although several of the other victims had previously identified Hoag
from a photograph, they could not identify him at the trial. Hoag's de-
fense was that he was not present within the state at the time the robbery
took place. He was acquitted, but shortly thereafter was indicted and tried
for the robbery of another of the victims and was convicted. The Court
ruled that the State's decision to try the defendant a second time was not
so unreasonable or oppressive as to deprive him of due process of law.
In Ciucci v. State of Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), the defendant was
charged in four separate indictments with murdering his wife and three
children, all of whom, with bullet wounds in their heads, were found dead
in a burning building. In three successive trials, Ciucci was found guilty
of the first degree murder of his wife and two of his children. The horrid
details of the four deaths were introduced into evidence at each trial. In
the first and second trials, the punishment was fixed at 20 and 45 years im-
prisonment respectively. At the third trial, involving the death of another
child, the penalty was fixed at death. The Court here held that the State
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Prosecutor's determination to try Ciucci separately for each murder, mass-
ing in each trial the gruesome details of each of the four deaths, until a
death sentence was obtained, was not so lacking in fundamental fairness
as to deprive him of his right of due process of law.
As authority for its decisions, the Court referred to its opinion in Palko
v. Connecticut,' wherein a defendant was convicted of second degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Pursuant to a statute, 2 the
state appealed the verdict. Upon appeal, the conviction was reversed and a
new trial ordered which resulted in a conviction for first degree murder
and a death sentence. The Court, in upholding the conviction, said:
Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a
hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it vio-
late those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions"? 3
That the states have a wide latitude in the administration of their own
systems of criminal justice is well settled. 4 But how far may a state go in
"getting its man"? May it harass him until he is old and weary? Is the
criterion set out in Palko so general and discretionary as to afford a crimi-
nal defendant little protection from the wrath and vengeance of the
prosecuting attorney? In Brock v. North Carolina,5 the Supreme Court
held that a state court properly terminated a trial, at the request of the
prosecution, when several of the state's key witnesses refused to testify,
and then properly retried the case when the state was better prepared.
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, criticized the state's pro-
cedure but found that it was not in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. He said:
A State falls short of its obligation when it callously subjects an individual
to successive retrials on a charge on which he has been acquitted or prevents
a trial from proceeding to a termination in favor of the accused merely in
order to allow a prosecutor who has been incompetent or casual or even in-
effective to see if he cannot do better a second time.6
In addition to resolving the issue of due process in the instant cases, the
Court held that the defendants, Hoag and Ciucci, were not put in double
1302 U.S. 319 (1937).
2 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) S 8812: "Appeals by the state in criminal cases. Appeals
from the rulings and decisions of the superior court or of the court of common pleas,
upon all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the
state, with the permission of the presiding judge, to the supreme court of errors, in the
same manner and to the same effect as if made by the accused."
3 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
4 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
5344 U.S. 424 (1953). 6Ibid., at 351.
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jeopardy.' That neither the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment8 nor the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the
states from prosecuting a defendant more than once is well settled.9 Every
state, however, either by adoption of the common law or by constitutional
amendment, follows the rule against double jeopardy.
If in a single criminal act more than one person is killed or robbed, does
the death of each person or the theft of each person constitute a separate
offense so as to warrant more than one prosecution?' ° Most courts adhere
to an "act offense dichotomy" permitting the state to prosecute the
accused as many times as there are deaths or thefts.1 However, a: few
states have followed the "same transaction rule" whereby the state is
limited to one trial.'1 2
The doctrine of double jeopardy is recognized as having had its origin
in Rex v. Duchess of Kingston.13 Twenty years later in Rex V. Vander-
comb and Abbot,14 the "same evidence test" was established. Under this
test, an acquittal under the first indictment will not be a bar to a'second
indictment unless the facts contained in the second indictment, if proved,
could have brought a conviction under the first indictment.'5 Both New
Jersey and Illinois (where the Hoag and Ciucci cases were tried) follow
the "same evidence test" thereby equating the number of offenses .with
the number of victims.16
7 U.S. Const. Amend. 5; Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776). .
8 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
9 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Armine v. Tines, 131 F.2d 827 (C.A. loth,
1942).
10 This subject is discussed in: Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res
Judicata, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 317 (1954); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double
Jeopardy, 58 Yale L. J. 513 (1949); Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single
Criminal Act, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 805 (1937).
11 Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915); State v. Corbett, 117 S.C. 356, 109 S.E.
133 (1921); In re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 22 Pac. 820 (1889); Nichols v. Commonwealth,
78 Ky. 180 (1879).
12 State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933); People v. Barr, 259,N.Y.
104, 181 N.E. 64 (1932); State v. Roberts, 170 La. 727, 129 So. 144 (1930); Spanruell v.
State, 83 Tex. Crim. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918).
13 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776).
14 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796).
5 E.g., Medlock v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 718, 288 S.W. 670 (1926).
16 State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); State v. Di Giosis, 3 N.J. 413, 70
A.2d 756 (1950); People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1937). It is interesting to
note that after several years of study, the American Law Institute has proposed that
there be a single prosecution for persons charged with perpetrating several different
offenses where the offenses arise out of a single act or from a single motive. Model
Penal Code § 108(2) (tent. draft no. 5, 1956).
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Another important issue in the Hoag case was whether Hoag was de-
prived of due process where the question of his identity was litigated
twice. In other words, did the determination in the first trial that Hoag
did not commit the crime estop the prosecution from indicting him a
second time, since the only real issue in the first trial was his identity?
Collateral estoppel, as an aspect of the broader doctrine of res judicata,
bars a redetermination of a question of fact which was essential to a judg-
ment in a prior suit. A majority of the court held that it was unnecessary
to rule on the constitutionality of collateral estoppel since there was no
way of determining from the verdict in the first trial upon what question
the verdict turned.
A similar view was taken in People v. Rodgers" where a criminal de-
fendant was found "not guilty" of robbing one of the prosecuting wit-
nesses. This same defendant was then brought to trial for the robbery of
another of the witnesses and was convicted. Both robberies occurred at
the same time and place. Rodgers alleged that he was elsewhere at the time
the crime was supposed to have been committed. The court ruled that the
general acquittal in the first trial did not necessarily mean that the jury be-
lieved the defendant's alibi, for they could have believed that the prosecu-
tion had failed to prove the essential allegations of the crime of robbery.' 8
However, other courts of review have examined the record more care-
fully. than did the court in the Rodgers case, and have found that only one
issue was litigated. 19 For example, in Harris v. State,'20 the accused was
arrested for the murder and robbery of a young merchant. He was ac-
quitted of the murder charge and thien later brought to trial on the rob-
bery charge. The guilt or innocence of the defendant in the first trial
hinged on whether he had participated with another in the murder and
robbery of the merchant. The court said:
Since it indisputably appears that the defendant could not be guilty of the
present charge without also being guilty of the crime of which he has been
tried and acquitted, he cannot now be put in jeopardy for the purpose of again
adjudicating the issue which has already been determined in his favor.21
17 102 N.Y. Misc. 437, 170 N.Y. Supp. 86 (1918); aff'd 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E. 882
(1919).
Is Cf. United States v. Adams, 281 U.S. 202 (1930); United States v. Dockery, 49 F.
Supp. 907 (E.D.N.Y., 1943); United States v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Mo.,
1941); State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).
19 United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (C.A. 3d, 1943); People v. Grzesczak, 77
N.Y. Misc. 202, 137 N.Y. Supp. 538 (1912); cf. Emich Motors Corporation v. General
Motors Corporation, 340 U.S. 558 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575
(1948); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
20 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941).
21 Ibid., at 581.
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Similarly, for the Supreme Court to find that Hoag was properly tried a
second time although the facts indisputably showed that he could not have
been guilty of the second charge without also being guilty of the first is
apparently inconsistent with concepts of fair criminal procedure. If there
had been ten victims, could the state have prosecuted Hoag ten times?
The Court found that the state's determination to try Hoag again after
the prosecuting witnesses' unexpected failure to identify him was neither
arbitrary nor lacking in justification. The Court is apparently placing a
premium on "unpreparedness."
In the Ciucci case, the state tried Ciucci three times and undoubtedly
would have tried him a fourth if the death penalty had not already been
obtained. Ostensibly there was no justification for not trying all four
murders at one time except the prosecutor's desire to obtain a death sen-
tence. The problem of whether the possible benefits to society from mul-
tiple trials outweigh the suppression of individual liberty was fairly sum-
marized in the case of In re Spier, where the court said:
In this case, the guilt or innocence of the prisoner is as little the subject of in-
quiry, as the merits of any case can be, when it is brought before this Court
on a collateral question of law. Although the prisoner, if unfortunately guilty,
may escape punishment, in consequence of the decision this day made in his
favor, yet it should be the bulwark of safety to those, who more innocent,
may become the subjects of persecution, and whose conviction, if not pro-
cured on one trial, might be secured on a second or third, whether they were
guilty or not.22
22 12 N.C. 329, 331 (1828). In this case, after the jury had been sworn in and evidence
presented, the court adjourned for the summer. The defendant was again brought to
trial at the beginning of the new term.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-WIFE NOT ALLOWED TO
RECOVER FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CAUSED
BY NEGLIGENT INJURY TO HER HUSBAND
Plaintiff's husband was seriously injured when a taxicab in which he
was a passenger collided with a train. He brought an action against the
railway company, the taxicab company, the train engineer, and the cab
driver, obtaining a judgment which was affirmed on appeal. During the
pendency of that action his wife brought suit against these same defend-
ants for loss of consortium1 allegedly resulting from their negligence. The
Superior Court sustained a general demurrer by the railroad and the
engineer 2 without leave to amend, and the wife appealed. The Supreme
1 This court defines consortium as "the non-economic aspects of marriage, including
conjugal society, comfort, affection, and companionship."
2 The taxicab company and its driver are not mentioned in the judgment or the notice
of appeal, and the record does not disclose the status of this case with respect to them.
